The existing literature on gender effects in the electoral process offers little evidence of significant gender vote share differentials. In this paper it is shown that for the 2006 Canadian federal election once candidate campaign spending is introduced into the model with appropriate flexibility in the vote share responsiveness across genders, significant differences are found to exist between male and female candidates. The findings suggest that for equal levels of spending, male incumbents have a vote share advantage relative to female incumbents though this vote share advantage is found to diminish with increased expenditures. Female non-incumbent candidates on the other hand, have a vote share advantage over male non-incumbent candidates for higher levels of expenditure and this advantage was found to increase with increased expenditures.
I. Introduction
As women have increasingly gained ground in the political arena the role of gender on the electoral process has become an important area of scholarly research. Despite the significant inroads women have made over the past few decades, the under-representation of this group remains a persistent feature of the political landscape in Canada. Both the nomination of women candidates in the party selection process and the performance of women candidates in federal elections have been identified as critical measures of women's participation in the political process. The number of women holding federal cabinet positions has also been a concern for women's equity issues.
The local nomination of candidates may partly explain why fewer women than men are elected into the House. If women tend to be nominated in unwinnable ridings (i.e. lost-cause districts, fringe party representation, etc.) then it is not surprising that they do not subsequently go on to win a seat in the election. In terms of the performance of women candidates at the polls, previous studies have shown that they are not disadvantaged because of their gender.
The objective of this paper is to extend the models presented in the literature in order to examine the role that candidate gender plays in a model that includes campaign spending. The general form of the models presented in the literature involve the candidate's vote share expressed as a function of gender and various other measures such as incumbency status and party affiliation. This paper allows for differences in vote share responsiveness across gender with respect to two key candidate-level variables: incumbency status and campaign spending.
Allowing for such differences is important if, for instance, male incumbent candidates are expected to be different than female incumbent candidates in terms of their marginal impact of expenditures on vote shares. Such a difference might arise as a result of a propensity for "entrenched" incumbents to be male, creating a more responsive effect of campaign spending by male incumbents in general. On the other hand, the effectiveness of challengers' spending may vary by gender, perhaps favouring women candidates who have, more recently, entered federal political races as high-profile public figures (for example, as lawyers, entrepreneurs, or community leaders).
This paper examines these candidate vote share differentials across genders in the context of the most recent 2006 Canadian federal election, that is, conditional on the candidate winning the local nomination contest, the effect of gender is examined. The study of gender effects in politics has a long history. Beginning in the 1970s the literature on this topic has generally found that once relevant factors are controlled for, a candidate's gender does not significantly affect his or her vote share. In Australia, Studlar and McAllister (1991) estimate a path model using ordinary least squares regression and do not find gender to be a significant determinant of vote share. Sawer (1981) and Mackerras (1980) similarly do not find significant differences between votes for male and female candidates. In the United States, Darcy et al. (1994) report that women fare as well as men in terms of support in general state elections. For British general elections, Studlar et al. (1988) examine the 1987 election and find that once constituency characteristics are controlled for in a regression with candidate vote share as the dependent variable, any initial female disadvantage essentially disappears. Norris et al. (1992) find no gender effect when appropriate controls are accounted for in the model. Rasmussen (1983) employs a number of techniques and does not find any evidence to suggest that female candidates are disadvantaged relative to male candidates for the 1979 British general election. Hills (1981) , in her study of British elections in 1966 British elections in , 1970 British elections in , and 1974 finds that a candidate's gender has only a slight effect on election outcomes. Welch and Studlar (1988) The paper begins by discussing the empirical strategy and the data from the 2006 election in some detail. The empirical results are then presented followed by the conclusion and suggestions for future research.
II. Empirical Strategy and Data
The analysis first examines vote share differences between male and female candidates allowing only for a constant average difference between the two genders. In so doing, regressions reflective of the literature are presented. The analysis is then extended to allow for these male and female candidates to differ in their vote share responsiveness with respect to incumbency status and campaign expenditures. Palfrey (2000, 1998) , Palda and Palda (1998) , Gerber (1998) , Nagler and Leighley (1992) , Green and Krasno (1988) . The consensus of these studies is that the evidence supports a significant effect of campaign spending on election outcomes. This finding is also supported for local spending in Canadian federal elections. Most recently, Rekkas (2007) and Eagles (2004) show that a candidate's campaign spending is an important determinant of a candidate's vote share. will not satisfy the exogeneity assumption of ordinary least squares as these expenditures will be correlated with the model error. In this case, instrumental variable techniques can be used.
The lagged (previous election) campaign spending of the candidate's party in the riding is used as an instrument for current period spending; the instrument used for total opponent spending is the lagged value of this variable. The instrumental variables approach then involves a first stage which consists of a candidate's campaign spending and the total spending by the candidate's opponents (in the district) regressed on these two instruments and control variables.
The second stage consists of a candidate's vote share regressed on a candidate's campaign spending, the total spending by the candidate's opponents and control variables. The idea is to use the variation in the spending variables induced by the variation in the instruments to estimate the causal relationship of spending on vote shares.
It is noted that if the same candidate ran in the previous election, then using the lagged values of the spending variables as instruments may be questionable. 2 For this reason, regressions are also done (though not reported) using the candidate's campaign contributions from the previous election as an exogenous regressor to proxy for candidate quality. 3 The campaign spending is thereby net of this quality indicator for these regressions. It is noted that this issue of the endogeneity of campaign expenditures may not be as severe an issue in Canada as compared to in the United States. In Canada, due to the political system in place, the individual candidate features less prominently than in the U.S. thus making it relatively less likely that expenditures will be tied to candidate unobservables.
To control for the competitiveness of the candidate's riding, a measure of competitiveness is constructed using the candidate's party electoral performance in the district in the previous election. The district-level variables are used to control for the economic and demographic nature of the ridings and include the population density of the riding, average income, the standard error of this average income, the share of Canadian citizens, and various education shares with the share of university educated individuals in the riding as the reference category. In terms of vote share, the mean of the distribution for female incumbents however, is still lower than the mean of the distribution for male incumbents; however, the differential spread is lower than what was observed in the first two columns. Table 1 shows that male incumbents tend to win by more of a margin than female incumbents and in fact this is true for any male/female comparison across the table. tables.
III. Results

--------[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] --------
The preceding regression approach is reflective of what appears in the literature. Given the controls included in the models, the gender of the candidate does not have any explanatory power with respect to the candidate's vote share. This finding supports the general, though not universal, results found in the literature.
Column (b) augments the regression of column (a) with two expenditure variables: the candidate's own campaign spending and the total campaign spending by the candidate's rivals.
Column (d) presents this regression accounting for the endogeneity of candidate and total opponent spending through IV regressions. Recalling the earlier discussion of IV regression, the lagged campaign expenditures of the candidate's party in the riding is used as an instrument for current period expenditures and total opponent spending is instrumented with its lagged value.
Robust standard errors clustered by federal electoral districts have been reported for all the regressions in the table. Although provincial dummy variables have been included in all the regressions, their coefficients are not reported. Table 2 shows that among all specifications given in columns (a), (b) and (d), the candidate's gender is once again not a significant determinant of vote share. In terms of the other candidate- It is noted once again that all the regressions presented in the paper have been additionally estimated (though not reported) with the inclusion of the candidate's party's campaign contributions from the previous election as an independent variable. This variable was included in the regressions as an exogenous variable to try and proxy for candidate quality. All specifications with this variable were robust to this variable insofar as providing qualitatively similar results to the estimated regressions reported in the paper.
In light of the summaries presented in Table 1 , it is important to consider underlying gender differences in vote share with respect to incumbency status and campaign spending. To specify a model that allows for a difference in the vote share responsiveness between male and female candidates with respect to incumbency status and campaign expenditures, interaction terms are added to the regression models. Table 2 contains regressions with the addition of two interaction terms, Male×Incumbent and Male×Expenses, and these results are reported in columns (c) and (e) using OLS and IV, respectively. These two terms allow for varying gender impacts of incumbency status and spending on a candidate's average vote share.
To gain a better understanding of the interaction terms in this model, Figures 1a and 1b when each candidate spends approximately $100,000 using the OLS estimates or approximately $90,000 using the IV estimates. This figure is also useful to gauge the amount female incumbents would have to spend to equalize the vote share gap for any given amount spent by male incumbents. Male challengers also enjoy a vote share advantage over female challengers that similarly diminishes with increased expenditures. However, this vote share advantage disappears when both candidate types spend approximately $50,000 using the OLS estimates or approximately $40,000 using the IV estimates, upon which the vote share advantage is taken over by female challengers. Again, this assumes that both candidates spend the same amount, which is by no means necessary as the figure can be used to identify the vote share differential for candidates who spend different amounts.
Focusing on column (e), The coefficients on , , , as well as and are all significant determinants of candidate vote share for all the estimated models. It is important to note that the coefficient associated with , can no longer be interpreted as a main effect, instead the estimated value of 3.44 represents the vote share advantage for male challengers over female challengers when each candidate's expenditures are zero. In terms of gender differences amongst incumbents, male incumbents earn percentage points more vote share than female challengers. In terms of the marginal return to spending, the estimated negative value of -0.12 reveals that female candidates are able to convert an additional dollar of spending into a higher vote share compared to male candidates. These important gender and incumbency differences with respect to campaign spending highlight the importance of the two interaction terms included in the model. The rest of the coefficients estimated in column (e) are qualitatively similar to those coefficients estimated in the other columns.
A next step in the analysis would be to obtain more data, in particular, to obtain a series of elections to exploit the panel structure of the data as well as analyze gender differentials more closely by considering these effects at the party level.
IV. Conclusions
Using an appropriately specified regression model, this paper shows significant, though not straightforward, gender effects amongst the candidates in the 2006 Canadian general election.
First, male incumbent candidates were found to enjoy a vote share advantage over female incumbent candidates over practically the full range of campaign expenditure levels. This advantage or gap in the vote share differential was found to decrease with higher levels of expenditures and in fact equaled zero near expenditure levels of $90,000. Second, male candidates who were not incumbents were also found to enjoy a vote share advantage over female candidates who were not incumbents for ranges of expenditures less than approximately $40,000, but above this amount the vote share advantage was reversed. The vote share differential was found to decrease with increased expenditures up to this threshold amount and then increase with increased expenditures above the threshold, indicating that female challengers who spent relatively large amounts were able to obtain a vote share advantage over their male counterparts.
This paper sheds some light on the importance of accounting for campaign spending and allowing for differences in vote share responsiveness across the genders. In terms of policy regarding campaign spending limits, it is essential to have a correctly specified model to properly understand the implication of such reforms on the vote share of male and female candidates. By incorporating a more flexible model than models used in prior research, this paper improves policymakers' understanding of the dynamics of gender effects in Canadian general elections. 2 Valid instruments must satisfy two conditions. First, they must be highly correlated to the endogenous variables, and second, they must be uncorrelated to the unobservable component of the model (i.e. the model error). The first condition is satisfied, current spending levels and lagged spending are highly correlated variables. If the model error contains candidate-specific unobservables then the second condition may not be satisfied for repeat candidates as lagged spending may be correlated to this component of the model for these candidates. 3 If the candidate did not run in the previous election then the candidate's party's lagged campaign contributions are used. 4 The education shares included in the models are: the share with the highest level of education less than high school, the share of high school graduates, the share with trades certificates or diplomas, and the college-educated share. 5 Although female incumbent candidates receive, on average, larger transfers than male incumbent candidates, this result is dependent upon the party affiliation of the candidate. If we examine the transfers on a party basis, it is the Liberal and Conservative female incumbents who receive more than their male counterparts, while in other parties the reverse is true. 6 Regressions using the full sample of candidates have been estimated and do not qualitatively differ from those presented in Table 2 for major party candidates. Table 2 column (e) for major party candidates only. 
Notes
